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1. Introduction
Animal vaccination has the potential to indirectly improve house-
hold nutrition (Lankester et al., 2015) or translate into investments in
human education and health (Marsh, Yoder, Deboch, McElwain, &
Palmer, 2016) for the>80 percent of poor livestock-keeping house-
holds living in extreme poverty in Africa (Otte et al., 2012). Efforts to
encourage animal vaccination target availability issues by training local
community health workers to deliver vaccines (Mariner et al., 2012)
and promote accessibility through financial incentives that reduce the
cost of the vaccine for livestock owners (Jibat, Hogeveen, & Mourits,
2015). Despite these efforts, households underinvest in livestock vac-
cines. This is due in part to the provision of veterinary goods and ser-
vices of variable quality and reliability in Africa (Ilukor, 2017), coupled
with the unpredictability of adverse health events (Dean et al., 2017),
and household responsibilities to invest in competing needs across
humans and animals, with direct correlates to human food supply
taking precedence (Quinn, Huby, Kiwasila, & Lovett, 2003; Waithanji,
Wanyoike, & Liani, 2015). Increasing information provision to allow
households to more accurately determine whether vaccination is ne-
cessary would encourage them to reconsider the benefits to vaccination,
including the indirect advancement of household wellbeing.
For decision-making about infectious disease in humans and ani-
mals, early disease detection through diagnostic testing offers direct
benefits to the individual by providing timely information regarding the
necessity for future treatments and costs (Bonner, Monroe, Talley,
Klasner, & Kimberlin, 2015; McKenna & Dohoo, 2006). For a rapid
diagnostic test to detect malaria in Africa, the affordability and avail-
ability of the test affects demand, but the provision of highly reliable
tests may also help reduce the disease burden by signaling to in-
dividuals the need for antimalarial treatments (or not) (Cohen, Dupas,
& Schaner, 2015). Motivation to apply cost-effective control strategies
similarly drive individual households and farms worldwide to use di-
agnostic testing for infectious disease control in animals (Theurer,
White, & Renter, 2015). Testing for the presence or absence of in-
fectious disease in both humans and animals then creates information
on treatment needs that may spill over to the entire community. This
collective aspect of testing embodies the public good implications of
disease control to achieve population immunity while providing others
in the community with enhanced decision-making capacities to benefit
privately. When disease control strategies that encompass local prio-
rities are necessary to address the emergence of infectious disease
(Halliday et al., 2017), assessing whether livestock-dependent house-
holds are willing to pay for early disease detection with public good
implications offers valuable insight into household-driven control
strategies broadly.
Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is an endemic, highly contagious
viral disease that reduces the productivity of livestock (Knight-Jones &
Rushton, 2013). Currently, Tanzanian households mitigate the impacts
of FMD with therapeutic antibiotics to treat secondary infections. The
limited availability of current and past FMD vaccines in northern
Tanzania and the frequent failure to match the vaccine with the cir-
culating diversity of serotypes and sub-types has, historically, induced
uncertainty in the protective quality of FMD vaccination (Railey,
Lembo, Palmer, Shirima, & Marsh, 2018). Recent research in northern
Tanzania, however, demonstrated that, rather than numerous serotypes
circulating simultaneously within a region, FMD outbreaks occur in a
regular pattern with each sequential outbreak being caused by a dif-
ferent dominant serotype that sweeps slowly across the region (Casey-
Bryars et al., 2018). These findings encourage consideration for im-
proved FMD control through a diagnostic technology that enables fast
in-situ detection of current serotypes. Early detection would provide
time to implement vaccination programs in response to an outbreak
with the right vaccine in households sufficiently distant to have not yet
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been affected. Equipping communities with a field-based mechanism
for early detection would enable individual households to make in-
formed disease prevention choices while providing the community with
the opportunity to coordinate population-level control.
To examine household preferences for accurate and timely vaccine
information delivered through diagnostic testing, we surveyed live-
stock-dependent households to investigate their willingness to pay
(WTP) for a diagnostic test that could indicate which FMD vaccine to
apply during an outbreak. We framed the question of willingness to pay
such that households contribute to a local fund to purchase the test and
have a public veterinarian perform the test on a few, randomly selected
infected animals. The collective approach to testing addresses the po-
tential for households and the community jointly to acquire information
about the circulating type of FMD to enhance vaccine decision-making
for both private and public interests. Households were informed that
trained professionals would apply the test, thus, implying an accurate
test and widespread, objective dissemination of results to incentivize
and assure contributions.
Households provided a stated willingness to pay for diagnostic
testing at around 6000 Tsh (USD 2.85). We found low-entry barriers
and the provision of the test at a small fixed cost encouraged household
willingness to contribute, particularly from households with access to
liquid monetary resources and increasing herd sizes. Households ex-
hibiting a strong imperative for livestock health-seeking behavior
placed a higher value on the test than those responding to externally
organized vaccination campaigns. Finally, we found evidence of a tra-
deoff between antibiotic usage and preventative health measures, in-
cluding diagnostic testing to better inform vaccine choices.
We outline these results by first describing the data through a re-
view of the survey setting, sampling procedure, and instrument, fol-
lowed by presenting the summary statistics and estimation strategy.
The paper concludes with the results and discussion on the empirical
findings in the context of policy implications for the role of diagnostic
testing in reducing the burden of animal disease.
2. Data
2.1. Setting
The study area included two districts of northern Tanzania,
Ngorongoro and Serengeti, located between the border of Kenya and
the Serengeti National Park (Fig. 1). Agro-pastoralists that engage in
agriculture and livestock-keeping income generation activities pri-
marily characterize the Serengeti District. Agro-pastoralists and tradi-
tional pastoralists who have been driven to adopt some agro-pastoralist
practices (Lankester & Davis, 2016) occupy the study sites in the
Ngorongoro District. Similar to agro-pastoralist and pastoralist liveli-
hoods globally, cattle in the study districts remain important to se-
curing nutritional diversity through the production of milk, meat, and
other by-products. Cattle also provide economic security in the form of
assets, cash from livestock sales, and value-added agricultural produc-
tion (Randolph et al., 2007). For cattle-owning households, improve-
ments to livestock health impacts household income and wealth, food
security, and expenditures on human health and education (Marsh
et al., 2016).
FMD not only restricts international trade, but has direct implica-
tions for household production, including decreased animal milk yield,
high mortality of valuable young stock, lost animal draught power, and
closure of or inability to access livestock markets (Perry & Rich, 2007).
In Tanzania specifically, households experience significant reductions
in milk production and cash from livestock sales, with negative impacts
on agriculture potential from losses to traction capacity (Casey-Bryars
et al., 2018). Despite the control of FMD through vaccination in some
parts of the world (Naranjo & Cosivi, 2013), the presence of four of the
seven serotypes with numerous subtypes for each complicates the
vaccination process in East Africa. Although the clinical presentation of
FMD from each serotype is indistinguishable, protection against these
signs depends upon the match of the correct vaccine to the circulating
viral serotype (Parida, 2009). Current in-situ diagnostic tests demon-
strate presence or absence of FMD (Ferris et al., 2010), but to recognize
the serotype causing infection requires laboratory-based diagnostics.
However, our hypothetical diagnostic testing scenario attempted to
capture preferences for the potential of vaccine matching when the
local serotype can be known.
2.2. Sampling
We used a multi-stage random sampling design to choose a re-
presentative sample of the heterogenous cattle owning population
across the two target districts. Based on the estimates of cattle owning
populations in the two survey districts (Basic Demographic and Socio-
Economic Profile, 2014), we planned to capture six villages and 300
households in the Serengeti District and four villages and 200 house-
holds in the Ngorongoro District. Following the selection of logistically
feasible administrative wards within the two districts, villages, sub-
villages, and households were randomly selected.
To obtain a household sampling frame for each sub-village of
households, groups combining village elders, government veterinar-
ians, and village leaders created a list of cattle owning households and
then randomly selected households. Enumerators fluent in the local
language (Swahili, in addition to either Kuria or Maa) were accom-
panied by community balozi heads or reputable individuals and su-
pervised throughout the survey. Pretesting and data collection for the
cross-sectional survey occurred between April 2016 and July 2016. A
total of 466 households provided complete responses to the diagnostic
testing willingness to pay questions. The remaining households con-
sisted of non-response households and illogical responses. We ad-
dressed non-responses by following up with households three times and
using cellphones to call absent heads of household. The resulting
random distribution of missing values across households, villages, and
enumerators lessens the likelihood of systematic bias from non-re-
sponders.
2.3. Survey instrument
The survey questionnaire contained questions on key variables that
may affect household diagnostic testing and vaccination preferences,
including household demographics, livestock management practices,
and knowledge of and history with FMD. To elicit willingness to pay
responses for individual contributions to diagnostic testing, which is a
non-market product that has limited history of use in Tanzania, we used
a stated-preference approach (Whittington, 1998). Specifically, we used
a double-bounded dichotomous choice contingent valuation method
(Hanemann, Loomis, & Kanninen, 1991). This is a standard survey
approach that can jointly analyze willingness to pay to adopt a product
and determine factors underlying adoption behavior. Households were
asked if they would contribute to a community fund to have a public
veterinarian test for the presence of FMD at the onset of an outbreak so
that they knew which vaccine to apply. We set the initial price for each
household’s contribution to the fund at 4000 Tanzanian shillings (USD
1.90) after pretesting a number of bid levels and referencing prices for
existing livestock health inputs, including vaccines and antibiotic
treatments. Households then received the question again with a higher
or lower contribution amount depending on the response to the first
question. For households that would contribute 4000 Tsh, the con-
tribution amount in the second question randomly varied between 4500
Tsh, 6000 Tsh, and 7500 Tsh (USD 2.15, 2.85, and 3.60). If households
said ‘no’ to the initial contribution level, then either 3500 Tsh, 2000
Tsh, or 500 Tsh (USD 1.70, 0.95, or 0.25) was randomly quoted for the
lower contribution level. We chose the double-bounded elicitation
method over other stated preference approaches (Hansen et al., 2013;
Huth, McEvoy, & Morgan, 2018) for its cognitive ease on respondents
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(Alolayan, Evans, & Hammitt, 2017) and gain in statistical efficiency
compared to a single question (Hanemann et al., 1991).
We framed the scenario to emphasize that the same information on
vaccine quality may be available to the entire community, following the
definition of a public good (Tietenberg & Lewis, 2012). The scenario
assumes a random selection of only a few cows from the community,
instead of testing each and every animal. To elicit truthful responses for
a good with public good characteristics, the proposed scenario must be
incentive compatible: respondents must care about the outcomes of the
event, perceive their actions as consequential, and only value a single
event with a likelihood of occurrence. For our scenario, we emphasized
the implications of the test to reduce vaccine matching error instead of
assuming household familiarity with diagnostic testing technology to
enhance the perceived relevancy of the test to the household. We then
evoked the perceived consequentiality of household preferences and
addressed the likelihood of receiving the test information through an
assurance contract (Tabarrok, 1998). Imposing an assurance contract
on the provision of the good encourages households to contribute by
providing the good if enough households contribute, or assuring the
household receives some benefit if others do not contribute. By stating a
public veterinarian will apply the test, we assumed delivery by a pro-
fessional institution with a tradition of providing veterinary services in
Tanzania ensures households receive quality and timely vaccine in-
formation (Leonard, Bloom, Hanson, O’Farrell, & Spicer, 2013).
The option to privately contribute to the test indicates the presence
of strategic responses that may undermine incentive compatibility
(Lloyd-Smith & Adamowicz, 2018). Provision bias will occur if house-
holds refused to answer the sequence of questions despite valuing the
test (scenario rejection) or attempted to increase the likelihood of test
provision by responding yes (yea-saying). We accounted for ‘scenario
rejection’ by asking an additional question as to why a household would
not pay for the test. Fewer than five percent of households presented
zero WTP amounts, but none cited reasons unrelated to the value of the
test (Mitchell & Carson, 1989). We reduced the chances for ‘yea-saying’
by pretesting a variety of price levels at representative households and
consulting local markets for livestock treatment prices (Boyle, Bishop, &
Welsh, 1985). For price comparisons, households reported spending
around 1000 Tsh (USD 0.50) per cow for substitute livestock health
treatments that included antibiotics, with four cows on average treated.
The households’ stated preferences for an emergency vaccine applied in
reaction to an outbreak and a routine vaccine applied biannually, both
offered as private goods per cow, averaged at 5400 Tsh (USD 2.60) and
3900 Tsh (USD 1.90), respectively (Railey et al., 2018). Follow up
questions were included as further checks (Section 4a).
2.4. Summary statistics
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the data used in the
analysis for the full sample and divided between the two districts. We
refer to the full sample to describe the average characteristics of the
households surveyed, while also providing the descriptions of the
variables that are significantly different between the two districts.
Households in these districts reported an average of 42 head of
cattle per herd, compared to the national average of four cows
(Tanzania Livestock Modernization Initiative, 2015). Households in
Ngorongoro maintained on average 49 heads of cattle compared to 36
heads of cattle in the Serengeti (p-value <0.05). For both districts,
household off-farm monthly income captured income liquidity separate
from on-farm production. Around 30 percent of households engaged in
off-farm activities, evenly dispersed across earning between 25 and
99,999 Tsh (USD 11.90–47.60) per month and 100,000+ Tsh
(USD > 47.60) per month. In the full sample, 45 percent of households
received seasonal income from agricultural sales, ranging from 16
percent receiving 25–99,999 Tsh, 13 percent at 100–499,999 Tsh, and
12 percent earning 500,000 Tsh (USD < 11.90, 11.90–238.00,
and > 238.00). Around 60 percent of households also reported re-
ceiving income from cattle sales with the number of animals sold in the
past year ranging from zero to 21 with an average of six animals sold.
Overall, almost 70 percent of households reported FMD outbreaks in
the year leading up to the survey, which is consistent with previous
accounts of FMD incidence in northern Tanzania (Casey-Bryars et al.,
2018). By providing positive responses to a set of knowledge questions,
over 30 percent of household’s indicated knowledge of testing for early
disease detection ahead of questioning. The Ngorongoro District
households demonstrated increased awareness of diagnostic testing
compared to those in the Serengeti District (p-value < 0.01). Across
Fig. 1. Location of the 10 study sites used for survey data collection across the two study districts.
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both target districts, only 19 percent of households reported vacci-
nating for any disease in the past year with all of these vaccines pro-
vided at a reduced price or for free. However, almost 80 percent of
households reported using antibiotics (oxytetracycline, penicillin, or
streptomycin) to treat livestock health problems, including secondary
infections related to FMD. Use of a public veterinarian for livestock
information (35 percent) and low willingness to pay for emergency
vaccines (23 percent) were also similar across study districts. To de-
lineate the effects of receiving professional information on uptake of
these livestock health practices, we included an interaction between use
of a public veterinarian and either antibiotics or vaccination. In the
Ngorongoro district, 23 percent of households both used antibiotics and
consulted with a public veterinarian compared to 34 percent of
households in the Serengeti (p-value < 0.05). For vaccination, only 6
percent of households in both districts also used a public veterinarian.
Low vaccination uptake accompanied by the majority of households
using antibiotics to treat animal diseases is consistent with existing
accounts of animal disease management practices in Tanzania (Caudell
et al., 2017).
3. Methods and estimation strategy
3.1. Conceptual framework
Here we present an illustrative model to motivate our empirical
approach, which is not intended to be a complete, definitive model of
vaccine decision-making. First consider the vaccination decision. A
household either employs a low-input herd maintenance plan (TC0) of
low-costs and low-productivity, or a household vaccinates for FMD
(TCv), thereby incurring the additional costs of vaccinating q animals
with per unit cost C and at a fixed cost FCv of acquiring the vaccines.
= ∗ +TC q C FCv v
A low likelihood (for example, one in four chance) of receiving a
vaccine that protects against the circulating FMD strain suggests
households are likely to realize the burden of added vaccine costs
without enhancing the productivity of the herd and without realizing
additional revenue. Fig. 2 presents this scenario whereby a higher
marginal cost (MC1) from an animal receiving an ineffective vaccine
compared to a low-input plan (MC0) reduces the household’s herd
profits from S0 to Sv.
In contrast, if the community implements diagnostic test before
vaccinating, the protection from a correctly matched and applied vac-
cine increases the productivity of the herd and total revenue from TR0
to TR1 while also increasing the total vaccination costs to TC1 by a per
herd, fixed cost FCd. Here, diagnostic testing plausibly presents a small
fixed cost to the household. The household jointly contributes with the
collective group to randomly test a few infected local animals, as op-
posed to including a variable cost to test each animal in the herd. The
total cost is then given by
= +TC TC FCv d1
The marginal revenue from securing the correct vaccine matched to
the circulating strain before possible disease exposure exceeds the
marginal revenue from a low-input plan (MR1) and the marginal rev-
enue from an inappropriately matched vaccine (MRv) without diag-
nostic testing (MR0). Hence, the shift from S0 to S1 improves net ben-
efits or profits to the household (Fig. 2).
3.2. Empirical approach
Empirically, we followed Hanemann et al. (1991) estimation
strategy for a double-bounded sequence of decisions (Appendix, Em-
pirical Estimation). Following expected utility theory, the model as-
sumes a household’s true WTP value falls within the specified intervals
from the responses to the first and second contribution levels. We used a
maximum likelihood estimator to retrieve the parameter estimates. We
then derived the marginal effect on WTP taken at the mean of each
parameter and estimated the mean WTP for the overall sample
(Hanemann, 1984). The delta method was employed to calculate the
confidence intervals around the estimated means (Greene, 2003).
4. Results
4.1. Robustness checks
Table 2 presents the coefficient estimates from the logistic prob-
ability function and the marginal effects from estimating the WTP
function. To decide on this model, we first assessed the potential for
separate models between the Serengeti and Ngorongoro districts. We
tested this by performing individual maximum likelihood estimations
for each district separately and a pooled estimation on the districts
Table 1
Descriptive statistics for variables relevant to diagnostic testing.
Variable Reported Averages (St Dev)
Full Sample Serengeti Ngorongoro
Information Treatment (0=No;
1=Yes)
0.09 0.09 0.10
(0.29) (0.28) (0.30)
Income
Monthly Off-Farm (≤24,999 Tsh)
(0=No; 1=Yes)
0.67 0.56 0.82
(0.47) (0.50) (0.39)
Monthly Off-Farm (25–99,999) (0=No;
1=Yes)
0.15 0.18 0.11
(0.36) (0.39) (0.31)
Monthly Off-Farm (100,000+) (0=No;
1=Yes)
0.17 0.24 0.07
(0.38) (0.43) (0.26)
Seasonal Agriculture (≤24,999 Tsh)
(0=No; 1=Yes)
0.62 0.58 0.69
(0.49) (0.49) (0.46)
Seasonal Agriculture (25–99,999)
(0=No; 1=Yes)
0.12 0.24 0.03
(0.32) (0.43) (0.17)
Seasonal Agriculture (100–499,999)
(0=No; 1=Yes)
0.13 0.17 0.08
(0.34) (0.37) (0.27)
Seasonal Agriculture (500,000+)
(0=No; 1=Yes)
0.12 0.07 0.20
(0.33) (0.25) (0.40)
Cattle sold in past year‡ 5.86 5.12 6.94
(6.68) (6.25) (7.14)
Herd Size‡ 41.3 36.4 48.5
(57.5) (57.2) (57.3)
Knowledge of diagnostic testing (0=No;
1=Yes)
0.31 0.22 0.43
(0.46) (0.41) (0.50)
Low emergency vaccine WTP (0=No;
1=Yes)
0.23 0.20 0.26
(0.42) (0.40) (0.44)
Use public vet (0=No; 1=Yes) 0.34 0.39 0.29
(0.48) (0.49) (0.45)
Vaccinated in past year (any cattle
disease) (0=No; 1=Yes)
0.19 0.19 0.23
(0.40) (0.40) (0.42)
Use antibiotics (0=No; 1=Yes) 0.79 0.78 0.80
(0.41) (0.41) (0.40)
Vaccinated*Use public vet (0=No;
1=Yes)
0.06 0.06 0.06
(0.23) (0.23) (0.24)
Use antibiotics*Use public vet (0=No;
1=Yes)
0.30 0.34 0.24
(0.46) (0.47) (0.43)
n 466 275 191
Notes: ‡ Reported mean for continuous variables. Values may exceed 100 per-
cent due to rounding.
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jointly. The test supports a pooled model instead of individual models
for each district, but the Serengeti reports a lower willingness to pay for
the test than the Ngorongoro district in the pooled model (-1610 Tsh;
USD 0.75).
The double-bounded stated preference method depends upon
households responding to the first and second contribution levels with
the same or similar WTP value in mind to ensure consistent responses
(Cameron & Quiggin, 1998). We asked households a follow-up, open-
ended question on the highest amount the household would pay for the
test after the double-bounded sequence of questions to evaluate this.
The responses from the follow-up question and the predicted WTP va-
lues presented similar distributions, suggesting households answered
with the same WTP value in mind throughout the survey (Appendix Fig.
A1). Moreover, the probability of a household paying for the test de-
creased with an increase in price, following theoretical expectations
(Mitchell & Carson, 1989) (Appendix Table A1).
The validity of the responses depends on whether households per-
ceived the scenario as consequential. After framing the question to
control for strategic responses attributed to scenario rejection based on
provision and price (Section 2c), we imposed an information treatment
on a portion of the sample (9 percent) to assess potential response bias
from unfamiliarity with the circulation of multiple FMD types. All
households received a simplified visual of the vaccine matching pro-
cess, accompanied by a short narrative on FMD, with a randomly se-
lected subset of the households receiving the treatment after the diag-
nostic testing WTP questions. Resource limitations drove the selection.
The selected subset of households served as a preliminary assessment of
any potential effects of information on WTP. The insignificant effect of
the information treatment suggests households had a basic under-
standing of the need to match vaccines to circulating types (Table 2).
4.2. Marginal effects
Contributions to diagnostic testing reflect household capacity to
invest in herd health as a private decision. Total herd size had a positive
effect on WTP. For illustrative purposes, as a measure per cow, a
household in the first quantile, owning between one and 10 head of
cattle, would value the test at 610 Tsh (USD 0.30) per cow. For the top
quantile of cattle owning households (> 46 cows), the value of the test
would equivocate to around 132 Tsh (USD 0.05) per cow reflecting the
diminishing marginal value of the test as herd size increases, albeit with
a larger total WTP value. Compared to households that received limited
off-farm monthly income (< 24,999 Tsh), households in the subsequent
income levels reported a higher WTP value by 1230 Tsh (USD 0.60)
(25–99,999 Tsh) and 2190 Tsh (USD 1.05) (100,000+ Tsh). In contrast,
no statistically significant difference in the value of diagnostic testing
manifested when comparing households in higher agricultural income
levels with those in the lowest level or across the number of cattle sold
in the past year.
Existing awareness of diagnostic testing in the absence of current
testing failed to predict WTP, but related livestock health practices
provided an indication of future adoption preferences. Households that
only applied antibiotics reported a lower WTP value than those
households not using antibiotics (−2920 Tsh, USD 1.40). Likewise,
households that vaccinated in the past year reported a lower WTP for
diagnostic testing than those not vaccinating (−1140 Tsh, USD 0.55).
Fig. 2. An illustration of the vaccination decision and diagnostic testing decision for this paper. Diagnostic testing adds a fixed cost to the total cost of vaccination
(TCv to TC1) while increasing total revenue (TR0 to TR1) for an increase in potential herd profits.
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Distinguishing low willingness to pay for emergency vaccines from
higher willingness to pay values revealed similar valuation of diag-
nostic testing across the two groups.
Finally, a willingness to consult with health professionals for med-
ical information may also affect individual adoption practices.
Acquiring information from a public veterinarian and using antibiotics
had a comparatively large marginal effect on WTP for diagnostic testing
by 3250 Tsh (USD 1.55) compared to only applying antibiotics or only
relying on a public veterinarian or neither. This positive effect extends
to vaccination by improving WTP by 1920 Tsh (USD 0.90) for house-
holds that vaccinated and benefited from receiving professional advice,
as opposed to those who only used one or the other resource or neither.
Households that reported receiving information from a public veter-
inarian without also employing livestock health inputs presented a
lower WTP for diagnostic testing than those not using this source
(−3920 Tsh, USD 1.90).
5. Discussion and conclusions
Our results contribute to growing research on the need for improved
information to ensure individually optimal uptake of disease control
measures by adding evidence on decision-making at the household level
for livestock health inputs that can improve vaccination decisions
(Marsh et al., 2016). Compared to vaccination that is per animal,
households value diagnostic testing as a fixed cost per herd. The test
represents a feasible input for a livestock-dependent household given
the cost decreases with each additional animal in the herd. This de-
creasing marginal value presents a low-entry barrier for households
with increasing herd sizes and access to liquid income, as demonstrated
by the relationship between WTP and off-farm income. Households
need not sacrifice investments in human essentials to afford the test
when agricultural decisions and livestock sales may reflect purposeful
consumption smoothing choices (Call, Gray, & Jagger, 2019; Hänke &
Barkmann, 2017) but do not strongly influence WTP. That the tradi-
tionally pastoralist households in the Ngorongoro district would pay
more for the test than the traditionally agro-pastoral communities in
the Serengeti further supports testing as an attractive production input
for large herds and communities with primarily livestock-keeping
households.
A household’s health-seeking behavior influences selection into
preventative care interventions. The few households in our study that
vaccinated in the past year reported intermittent vaccination with
subsidized vaccines offered by either a public or private professional
veterinarian (60 percent). These factors suggest existing efforts to signal
vaccine quality (Fischer, Karlan, McConnell, & Raffler, 2018), but over
limited vaccine availability, which may explain why previous vacci-
nation and preferences for vaccine price failed to depict the com-
plementary relationship between diagnostic testing and vaccination.
Simply reporting knowledge about diagnostic testing or reporting use of
a public veterinarian also failed to increase household WTP for testing.
Instead, households that actively engaged in disease management by
concurrently vaccinating or applying antibiotics while also separately
seeking livestock health advice from a public veterinarian demon-
strated a heightened WTP for testing. Akin to health-seeking behavior
for human conditions with a high likelihood of occurrence, these
practices may reflect heightened awareness of disease risk
(Chinkhumba, Godlonton, & Thornton, 2014; Kang et al., 2018) or in-
creased need for quality assured products. Relying on these households
to perpetuate diagnostic testing contributions may be problematic if
households cluster along behavioral ideologies or physical spaces that
cause inequalities in health information access and benefits (Reich,
2018). Ensuring the communal benefits of diagnostic testing ad-
ditionally requires understanding the distribution of households with
differential health behaviors across spatial and temporal patterns of
disease incidence.
The benefits of diagnostic testing in animals requires livestock-de-
pendent households to use the test information to make better sub-
sequent decisions that improve household wellbeing (McKenna &
Dohoo, 2006). For FMD, diagnostic testing that enhances vaccine
matching capabilities may then influence disease incidence, subsequent
treatment options, and possible health outcomes through enhanced
vaccination decision-making (Hoelzer et al., 2018). To this point, the
strong inverse relationship between current antibiotic use and WTP for
diagnostic testing suggests a potential substitution effect. When the 70
percent of households that reported FMD primarily treated secondary
infections with antibiotics, substitution away from therapeutic anti-
biotics to diagnostic testing and vaccination would capture a significant
market share. Household income may then indirectly benefit from this
substitution, as some households reported more than one FMD outbreak
per year. Importantly, if interest in early detection signals greater
trends in health behavior and veterinary antibiotic use correlates with
human health practices, such as sanitation and hygiene (Caudell et al.,
2018), reducing the use of veterinary therapeutic antibiotics may
benefit the community broadly, including through indirect reductions
in transmission of antimicrobial resistance.
To scale up disease control to the community and national level,
promoting compliance to early detection and preventative control
strategies at the household level is necessary. While households value
the prospects of receiving information to enhance vaccine matching
Table 2
Coefficients and marginal effects for variables used in analysis.
Variable Coefficients Marginal Effects
Information Treatment (0=No; 1=Yes) 0.50 1080
(0.37) (7 8 5)
Income
Monthly Off-Farm (25–99,999) (0=No;
1=Yes)
0.57 1230*
(0.31) (6 6 8)
Monthly Off-Farm (100,000+) (0=No;
1=Yes)
1.02 2190***
(0.24) (5 2 6)
Seasonal Agriculture (25–99,999) (0=No;
1=Yes)
0.12 250
(0.28) (5 9 3)
Seasonal Agriculture (100–499,999) (0=No;
1=Yes)
−0.54 −1170
(0.36) (7 7 0)
Seasonal Agriculture (500,000+) (0=No;
1=Yes)
0.34 −717
(0.38) (8 2 0)
Cattle sold in past year −0.004 −8.50
(0.02) (33.4)
Herd size† 0.19 400**
(0.10) (2 1 1)
Knowledge of diagnostic testing (0=No;
1=Yes)
0.10 221
(0.22) (4 7 7)
Low emergency vaccine WTP (0=No; 1=Yes) 0.01 25.3
(0.34) (7 3 8)
Use government vet (0=No; 1=Yes) −1.83 −3920**
(0.57) (1240)
Vaccinated in past year (0=No; 1=Yes) −0.53 −1140*
(0.29) (6 1 7)
Use antibiotics (0=No; 1=Yes) −1.36 −2920***
(0.33) (7 2 0)
Vaccinated*Use government vet (0=No;
1=Yes)
0.89 1920*
(0.52) (1130)
Use antibiotics*Use government vet (0=No;
1=Yes)
1.52 3250***
(0.58) (1250)
Serengeti district (0=No; 1=Yes) −0.75 −1610***
(0.23) (4 8 7)
Mean WTP 6110(4 0 6)
Notes: n=466. † log of variable. Standard errors in parenthesis. 2100
Tsh=USD 1
P value: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
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capabilities, long-term declines in participation may result (Chandler
et al., 2011; Dupas, Hoffmann, Kremer, & Zwane, 2016) if the vaccines
produce sub-optimal protection despite testing. Similar to human
health concerns (Newman-Toker, McDonald, & Meltzer, 2013), illus-
trating the tradeoffs between vaccination and other treatment strategies
and emphasizing when the benefit to vaccinating with testing exceeds
the benefit of not testing will provide households with the information
to make individually optimal decisions, which may include not vacci-
nating. Continued interactions with professional health providers fur-
ther help facilitate this learning process. In Tanzania, the presence of
public, private, and community health providers in a decentralized
system requires synchronizing the dissemination of information across
these sectors and within the communities. This serves to reduce mis-
information or delayed information access and overcome household
biases to acquire information from one source or another (Closser et al.,
2016).
Our study estimates household WTP for the provision of enhanced
vaccine information using a hypothetical, community diagnostic test.
Using alternative methodologies to assess the value of diagnostic testing
characteristics and experiments to evaluate preferences for livestock
health provision may elucidate the preferred delivery method of both
vaccines and enhanced vaccine information (Howard et al., 2011).
Expanding the power of the model through a larger sample size in each
district to capture variation within districts or across communities may
additionally highlight information inequalities resulting from structural
variations and norms (Buntaine, Daniels, & Devlin, 2018; Gottlieb,
2016). Similarly, a complete randomization of the information treat-
ment would extend our ability to infer whether disease control educa-
tion or information impacts contributions. As is, we only provide initial
results suggesting that the information did not significantly impact
WTP. Since the survey occurred a number of months after the last FMD
outbreak, the immediacy and relevancy of a recent outbreak does not
likely bias the results upwards. However, timing data collection periods
around outbreaks may improve understandings of the testing process,
especially if this can be accompanied by applying diagnostic testing
tools in the field with vaccine matching. This then will enhance uptake
by providing households with tangible evidence of a complex process.
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Appendix
Empirical estimation
We modeled respondents’ stated preferences for diagnostic testing and vaccine matching information assuming households regard the con-
tributions of others as given and contribute based on perceived individual benefits from testing. We formulate the contribution decision as a function
of the test price combination Bi presented to household i, a vector of observable household characteristics zi and unobservable random characteristics
∊. We assume the parameters enter into a household’s willingness to pay with the relationship :
= + + + ∊y B z α ρB λ z( , ) 'i i i i i i
Table A1
Probability of responding 'yes' to each bid (in Tsh).
Diagnostic Testing Bid Probability (%)
500 93
2000 87
3500 76
4000 72
4500 67
5000 62
7500 34
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where α, ρ and λ are unknown parameters to be estimated with a maximum likelihood estimator. We assumed the random error ∊ follows a
cumulative logistic distribution with a mean of zero and a variance of σ2.
We followed Hanemann et al. (1991) estimation strategy for a double-bounded sequence of decisions, assuming a household’s true WTP value yi
falls within the specified intervals from the responses to the first Binitial and second contribution levels Blow or Bhigh. A ‘no-no’ response indicated the
household WTP lies below the offered contribution price (-∞, Blow), while a ‘yes-yes’ response suggested the value is either the highest price offered,
or above that price [Bhigh,∞). The ‘no-yes’ and ‘yes-no’ responses imply the household’s maximumWTP fell between either of the two amounts [Blow,
BI) and [BI, Bhigh) respectively. A household’s true WTP value can be enclosed within specified intervals to result in four discrete outcomes:
=
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
<
≤ <
≤ <
≥
y
I ifWTP B
I ifB WTP B
I ifB WTP B
I ifWTP B
Pr( )
nn low
ny low initial
yn initial high
yy high
whereby Inn, Iny, Iyn, Iyyare binary-valued indicator variables denoted as one if the argument is true and corresponds to a ‘no-no,’ ‘no-yes,’ ‘yes–no,’
and ‘yes-yes’ response, respectively, or zero otherwise. We model these four outcomes as probability statements using a standard logistic distribution
F() with mean zero and scale of 1 (Kerr, 2000). The probability statements reflect the difference in indirect utility achieved from either accepting or
declining the proposed test contribution level. We then calculated the parameter values that maximize the log-likelihood of observing household i’s
responses to the first Binitial and second price contribution levels Blow or Bhigh given the probability statements for each price sequence:
∑= + + + ∊ + + + + ∊ − + + + ∊ +
+ + + ∊ − + + + ∊ + − + + + ∊
=
L
I α ρB λ z I α ρB λ z α B λ z I
α ρB λ z α B λ z I α ρB λ z
[ ln(F( ' )) ln(F( ' ) F( ' )) ln
(F( ' ) F( ' )) ln(1 F( ' ))]
i
n
nn low i i ny initial i i low i i yn
high i i inital i i yy high i i
1
From this, we derived the marginal effect on WTP taken at the mean of each parameter and estimated the mean WTP for the overall sample
(Hanemann, 1984). We used the delta method to calculate the confidence intervals around the estimated means (Greene, 2003). The analysis was
done in Stata 13 using the doubleb package (López-Feldman, 2013) and in Gauss 17.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wdp.2019.100144.
References
Alolayan, M. A., Evans, J. S., & Hammitt, J. K. (2017). Valuing mortality risk in Kuwait:
Stated-preference with a new consistency test. Environmental and Resource Economics,
66(4), 629–646. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-015-9958-1.
Basic Demographic and Socio-Economic Profile. (2014). Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
Retrieved from http://tanzania.countrystat.org/fileadmin/user_upload/countrystat_
fenix/congo/docs/2012 Tanzania Population and Housing Census-Basic
Demographic and Socio-Economic Profile.pdf.
Bonner, A. B., Monroe, K. W., Talley, L. I., Klasner, A. E., & Kimberlin, D. W. (2015).
Impact of the rapid diagnosis of influenza on physician decision-making and patient
management in the pediatric emergency department: results of a randomized, pro-
spective, controlled trial. Pediatrics, 112(2), 363–367.
Boyle, K. J., Bishop, R. C., & Welsh, M. P. (1985). Starting point bias in contingent va-
luation bidding games. Land Economics, 61(2), 188. https://doi.org/10.2307/
3145811.
Buntaine, M. T., Daniels, B., & Devlin, C. (2018). Can information outreach increase
Fig. A1. Boxplots of reported household WTP amounts from the open-ended question and the predicted household WTP amounts from the maximum likelihood
estimation for diagnostic testing.
A.F. Railey, et al. World Development Perspectives xxx (xxxx) xxxx
8
participation in community-driven development? A field experiment near Bwindi
National Park, Uganda. World Development, 106, 407–421. https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.worlddev.2017.10.029.
Call, M., Gray, C., & Jagger, P. (2019). Smallholder responses to climate anomalies in
rural Uganda. World Development, 115, 132–144. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
worlddev.2018.11.009.
Cameron, T. A., & Quiggin, J. (1998). Estimation using contingent valuation data from a
“dichotomous choice with follow-up” questionnaire: Reply. Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, 35(2), 195–199. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1998.
1026.
Casey-Bryars, M., Reeve, R., Bastole, U., Knowles, N., Auty, H., Bachanek-Bankowska, K.,
... Lembo, T. (2018). Waves of endemic foot-and-mouth disease in eastern Africa
suggest feasibility of proactive vaccination approaches. Nature Ecology & Evolution, 2,
1449–1457. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41559-018-0636-x.
Caudell, M. A., Mair, C., Subbiah, M., Matthews, L., Quinlan, R. J., Quinlan, M. B., ... Call,
D. R. (2018). Identification of risk factors associated with carriage of resistant
Escherichia coli in three culturally diverse ethnic groups in Tanzania: A biological
and socioeconomic analysis. The Lancet. Planetary Health, 2(11), e489–e497. https://
doi.org/10.1016/S2542-5196(18)30225-0.
Caudell, M. A., Quinlan, M. B., Subbiah, M., Call, D. R., Roulette, C. J., Roulette, J. W., ...
Quinlan, R. J. (2017). Antimicrobial use and veterinary Care among agro-pastoralists
in Northern Tanzania. e0170328 PLoS ONE, 12(1), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.
pone.0170328.
Chandler, C. I. R., Hall-Clifford, R., Asaph, T., Pascal, M., Clarke, S., & Mbonye, A. K.
(2011). Introducing malaria rapid diagnostic tests at registered drug shops in Uganda:
Limitations of diagnostic testing in the reality of diagnosis. Social Science and
Medicine, 72(6), 937–944. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2011.01.009.
Chinkhumba, J., Godlonton, S., & Thornton, R. (2014). The demand for medical male
circumcision. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 6(2), 152–177. https://
doi.org/10.1257/app.6.2.152.
Closser, S., Rosenthal, A., Maes, K., Justice, J., Cox, K., Omidian, P. A., ... Nyirazinyoye, L.
(2016). The global context of vaccine refusal: insights from a systematic comparative
ethnography of the global polio eradication initiative.Medical Anthropology Quarterly,
30(3), 321–341. https://doi.org/10.1111/maq.12254.
Cohen, J., Dupas, P., & Schaner, S. (2015). Price subsidies, diagnostic tests, and targeting
of malaria treatment: Evidence from a randomized controlled trial. American
Economic Review, 105(2), 609–645.
Dean, M., Scherr, C. L., Clements, M., Koruo, R., Martinez, J., & Ross, A. (2017). “When
information is not enough”: A model for understanding BRCA-positive previvors’
information needs regarding hereditary breast and ovarian cancer risk. Patient
Education and Counseling, 100(9), 1738–1743. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pec.2017.
03.013.
Dupas, P., Hoffmann, V., Kremer, M., & Zwane, A. P. (2016). Targeting health subsidies
through a nonprice mechanism: A randomized controlled trial in Kenya. Science,
353(6302), 889–895. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaf6288.
Ferris, N. P., Nordengrahn, A., Hutchings, G. H., Paton, D. J., Kristersson, T., Brocchi, E.,
... Merza, M. (2010). Development and laboratory validation of a lateral flow device
for the detection of serotype SAT 2 foot-and-mouth disease viruses in clinical sam-
ples. Journal of Virological Methods, 163(2), 474–476. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
jviromet.2009.09.022.
Fischer, G., Karlan, D., McConnell, M., & Raffler, P. (2018). Short-term subsidies and
seller type: A health products experiment in Uganda. Journal of Development
Economics, 137, 110–124. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2018.07.013.
Gottlieb, J. (2016). Why might information exacerbate the gender gap in civic partici-
pation? Evidence from Mali. World Development, 86, 95–110. https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.worlddev.2016.05.010.
Greene, W. H. (2003). Econometric Analysis (5). New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Halliday, J. E. B., Hampson, K., Hanley, N., Lembo, T., Sharp, J. P., Haydon, D. T., &
Cleaveland, S. (2017). Driving improvements in emerging disease surveillance
through locally relevant capacity strengthening. Science, 357(6347), 146–148.
Hanemann, M. (1984). Welfare evaluations in contingent valuation experiments with
discrete responses. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 66(3), 332–341.
https://doi.org/10.2307/1240800.
Hanemann, M., Loomis, J., & Kanninen, B. (1991). Statistical efficiency of double-
bounded dichotomous choice contingent valuation. American Journal of Agricultural
Economics, 73(4), 1255–1263. https://doi.org/10.2307/1242453.
Hänke, H., & Barkmann, J. (2017). Insurance function of livestock: Farmer’s coping ca-
pacity with regional droughts in South-Western Madagascar. World Development, 96,
264–275. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.03.011.
Hansen, K. S., Pedrazzoli, D., Mbonye, A., Clarke, S., Cundill, B., Magnussen, P., & Yeung,
S. (2013). Willingness-to-pay for a rapid malaria diagnostic test and artemisinin-
based combination therapy from private drug shops in Mukono district, Uganda.
Health Policy and Planning, 28(2), 185–196. https://doi.org/10.1093/heapol/czs048.
Hoelzer, K., Bielke, L., Blake, D. P., Cox, E., Cutting, S. M., Devriendt, B., ... Van
Immerseel, F. (2018). Vaccines as alternatives to antibiotics for food producing an-
imals. Part 1: Challenges and needs. Veterinary Research, 49(1), 1–10. https://doi.
org/10.1186/s13567-018-0560-8.
Howard, K., Salkeld, G., Pignone, M., Hewett, P., Cheung, P., Olsen, J., ... Roberts-
Thomson, I. C. (2011). Preferences for CT colonography and colonoscopy as diag-
nostic tests for colorectal cancer: A discrete choice experiment. Value in Health, 14(8),
1146–1152. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jval.2011.07.012.
Huth, W. L., McEvoy, D. M., & Morgan, O. A. (2018). Controlling an invasive species
through consumption: The case of lionfish as an impure public good. Ecological
Economics, 149(February), 74–79. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.02.019.
Ilukor, J. (2017). Improving the delivery of veterinary services in Africa: Insights from the
empirical application of transaction costs theory in Uganda and Kenya. Revue
Scientifique et Technique de l’OIE, 36(1), 279–289. https://doi.org/10.20506/rst.36.1.
2628.
Jibat, T., Hogeveen, H., & Mourits, M. C. M. (2015). Review on dog rabies vaccination
coverage in Africa: A question of dog accessibility or cost recovery? PLoS Neglected
Tropical Diseases, 9(2), 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0003447.
Kang, S. K., Jiang, M., Duszak, R., Heller, S. L., Hughes, D. R., & Moy, L. (2018). Use of
breast cancer screening and its association with later use of preventive services
among medicare beneficiaries. Radiology, 288(3), 660–668. https://doi.org/10.1148/
radiol.2018172326.
Kerr, G. N. (2000). Dichotomous choice contingent valuation probability distributions.
Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 44(2), 233–252. https://doi.
org/10.1111/1467-8489.00109.
Knight-Jones, T. J. D., & Rushton, J. (2013). The economic impacts of foot and mouth
disease – What are they, how big are they and where do they occur? Preventive
Veterinary Medicine, 112(3–4), 162–173. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.prevetmed.2013.
07.013.
Lankester, F., & Davis, A. (2016). Pastoralism and wildlife: Historical and current per-
spectives in the East African rangelands of Kenya and Tanzania. Revue Scientifique et
Technique de l’OIE, 35(2), 473–484. https://doi.org/10.20506/rst.35.2.2536.
Lankester, F., Lugelo, A., Kazwala, R., Keyyu, J., Cleaveland, S., & Yoder, J. (2015). The
economic impact of malignant catarrhal fever on pastoralist livelihoods. PLoS ONE,
10(1), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0116059.
Leonard, D. K., Bloom, G., Hanson, K., O’Farrell, J., & Spicer, N. (2013). Institutional
solutions to the asymmetric information problem in health and development services
for the poor. World Development, 48, 71–87. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.
2013.04.003.
Lloyd-Smith, P., & Adamowicz, W. (2018). Can stated measures of willingness-to-accept
be valid? Evidence from laboratory experiments. Journal of Environmental Economics
and Management, 91, 133–149. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2018.07.003.
López-Feldman, A. (2013). DOUBLEB: Stata module to compute Contingent Valuation
using Double-Bounded Dichotomous Choice. Boston, MA. Retrieved from https://
ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s457168.html.
Mariner, J. C., House, J. A., Mebus, C. A., Sollod, A. E., Chibeu, D., Jones, B. A., ... van ’t
Klooster, G. G. M. (2012). Rinderpest eradication: Appropriate technology and social
Innovations. Science, 337(6100), 1309–1312. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.
1223805.
Marsh, T. L., Yoder, J., Deboch, T., McElwain, T. F., & Palmer, G. (2016). Livestock
vaccinations translate into increased human capital and school attendance by girls.
Science Advances, 2(12), 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.1601410.
McKenna, S. L. B., & Dohoo, I. R. (2006). Using and interpreting diagnostic tests.
Veterinary Clinics of North America - Food Animal Practice, 22(1), 195–205. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.cvfa.2005.12.006.
Mitchell, R., & Carson, R. (1989). Using surveys to value public goods: The contingent
valuation method. Resources for the Future.
Naranjo, J., & Cosivi, O. (2013). Elimination of foot-and-mouth disease in South America:
Lessons and challenges. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London,
368(1623), https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2012.0381.
Newman-Toker, D. E., McDonald, K. M., & Meltzer, D. O. (2013). How much diagnostic
safety can we afford, and how should we decide? A health economics perspective.
BMJ Quality and Safety, 22. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjqs-2012-001616.
Otte, J., Costales, A., Dijkman, J., Pica-Ciamara, U., Robison, T., Ahuja, V., ... Roland-
Holst, D. (2012). Livestock sector for poverty reduction: An economic and policy per-
spective – Livestock’s many virtues. Rome, Italy: Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations.
Parida, S. (2009). Vaccination against foot-and-mouth disease virus: Strategies and ef-
fectiveness. Expert Review of Vaccines. https://doi.org/10.1586/14760584.8.3.347.
Perry, B. D., & Rich, K. (2007). Poverty impacts of foot-and-mouth disease and the
poverty reduction implications of its control. The Veterinary Record, 160, 238–241.
Quinn, C. H., Huby, M., Kiwasila, H., & Lovett, J. C. (2003). Local perceptions of risk to
livelihood in semi-arid Tanzania. Journal of Environmental Management, 68(2),
111–119. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0301-4797(03)00013-6.
Railey, A. F., Lembo, T., Palmer, G. H., Shirima, G. M., & Marsh, T. L. (2018). Spatial and
temporal risk as drivers for adoption of foot and mouth disease vaccination. Vaccine,
36, 5077–5083. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2018.06.069.
Randolph, T. F., Schelling, E., Grace, D., Nicholson, C. F., Leroy, J. L., Cole, D. C., ... Ruel,
M. (2007). Invited Review: Role of livestock in human nutrition and health for
poverty reduction in developing countries. Journal of Animal Science, 85(11),
2788–2800. https://doi.org/10.2527/jas.2007-0467.
Reich, J. A. (2018). “We are fierce, independent thinkers and intelligent”: Social capital
and stigma management among mothers who refuse vaccines. Social Science and
Medicine, 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2018.10.027.
Tabarrok, A. (1998). The private provision of public goods via dominant assurance
contracts. Public Choice, 96(3–4), 345–362. https://doi.org/10.1023/
A:1004957109535.
Tanzania Livestock Modernization Initiative. (2015). Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Retrieved
from http://livestocklivelihoodsandhealth.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/
Tanzania_Livestock_Modernization_Initiative_July_2015.pdf.
Theurer, M. E., White, B. J., & Renter, D. G. (2015). Optimizing feedlot diagnostic testing
strategies using test characteristics, disease prevalence, and relative costs of mis-
diagnosis. Veterinary Clinics of North America – Food Animal Practice. https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.cvfa.2015.05.002.
Tietenberg, T., & Lewis, L. (2012). Environmental and Natural Resource Economics (9). New
York: Pearson.
Waithanji, E., Wanyoike, S., & Liani, M. (2015). ILRI Discussion Paper 29: The role of gender
and other socio- economic factors in the adoption of the contagious bovine pleur-
opneumonia (CBPP) vaccine. Kenya: Nairobi Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/
10568/56926.
Whittington, D. (1998). Administering contingent valuation surveys in developing
countries. World Development, 26(1), 21–30. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X
(97)00125-3.
A.F. Railey, et al. World Development Perspectives xxx (xxxx) xxxx
9
